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Introduction 
 
Defining the geographical scope of an armed conflict is a matter that carries weight in more 
ways than one.1 Outside the legal sphere the question might seem like one that requires 
nothing more than common sense – if two (or more) parties are engaged in battle, then the 
area of conflict is wherever they are fighting. The reality – or at least the legal reality – is 
unfortunately one that does not conform to simple formulations. Being ‘at war’ or ‘going to 
war’ does not necessarily mean that the whole of a state is in fact embroiled in an armed 
conflict. For example, while most of Iraq became a zone of armed conflict in 2003, life for 
most people in the United States continued uninterrupted while its troops invaded a 
country on the other side of the globe. This can even be the case for both states involved, as 
was seen in the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas conflict between the UK and Argentina.2 The same 
is true for armed conflicts between a state and an organised armed group, which may be 
raging in one part of the country with little manifestation in other areas as is evident from 
the armed conflict between the armed forces of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF), which, for more than 20 years, was largely confined to the southern 
island of Mindanao.3 Clearly then, the actual hostilities do not necessarily correspond with 
the borders of the states(s) concerned. Another possibility is to base the determination of 
geographical scope on the existence of actual fighting. In other words, wherever there are 
hostilities, there is an armed conflict. But this too has its obstacles, including the question of 
how to determine what should count as hostilities, and whether there must be a temporal 
consistency within a specific geographical area that would eliminate occasional flare-ups 
from the scope. These issues will be returned to in greater detail in later sections.  
 
Our focus is on the particular challenges raised to the geographical scope of armed conflict 
by the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, commonly referred to as drones. Much has been 
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written about drones from a variety of perspectives,4 and we do not intend to repeat all the 
debates. Instead, the aim of this work is to asses not the drones themselves, but rather to 
examine one of the perceived ways in which the use of drones is affecting, if not leading, to 
the metamorphosis of armed conflict. The very notion of armed conflict appears to be going 
through a process of shape-shifting whereby the use of new technologies such as drones or 
cyber-operations are slowly erasing the crucial significance of geographical boundaries, 
truncating vast distances, and diminishing the need for boots on the ground.  
 
The ever-increasing use of drones as both a means and method in the pursuit of the ‘war on 
terror’ has given rise to concerns over the emergence of a ‘global battlefield’ whereby the 
entire planet is subject to the application of the laws of armed conflict and the 
consequences which flow from it.5 These concerns stem from drone strikes frequently 
occurring outside the ‘active battlefields’ of Afghanistan and into the border regions of 
Pakistan and expanding further afield into Yemen and Somalia. Extraterritorial drone strikes 
against non-state actors have thrust the question of the legal classification and regulation of 
transnational armed violence to the forefront of international concern and debate.6 Three 
foundational issues are inherent to such classification and regulation. First, there is the 
question of whether armed violence between a state and a non-state actor occurring in the 
territory of more than one state can be classified as a non-international armed conflict 
(NIAC) for the purposes of IHL. Conflicting opinions exist on this issue, with some 
commentators asserting that the concept of NIAC itself is by definition an internal armed 
conflict and therefore the scope of IHL is restricted to the territorial borders of the state 
experiencing the armed conflict.7 Others however, maintain that a NIAC is defined in 
contradistinction to an international armed conflict (IAC) and therefore any situation of 
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armed violence that amounts to armed conflict, and is not an IAC, is by default a NIAC 
irrespective of territorial borders.8 The key criteria for determining the nature of the conflict 
in this case, is to be based on the legal status of the opposing parties – a conflict between 
two or more states is international, while a conflict between a state and a non-state armed 
group (or between armed groups) is non-international.9 For these reasons, and based on 
more detailed examination elsewhere of the applicable law,10 this work proceeds on the 
premise that international armed conflicts are those between states, while an armed 
conflict between a state and an organised armed group should be classified as non-
international, even if it includes an extraterritorial manifestation.11 The second issue is then 
the need for determining the geographical scope of applicability of IHL during NIAC. As will 
be discussed throughout the course of this paper, while no single provision of IHL explicitly 
delineates its geographical scope, it is the application and interpretation of the individual 
provisions contained within IHL that are key to this determination. Although it is 
uncontested that IHL applies to the conduct of ‘battlefield hostilities’ between the parties to 
an armed conflict, the territorial parameters of the battlefield and the range of actions that 
fall within the remit of hostilities are neither defined in conventional IHL nor beyond debate. 
The third issue concerns the legal basis for and consequences of, crossing an international 
border during a prevailing armed conflict between a state and an organised armed group. 
Here divergent opinions exist as to the circumstances that warrant extraterritorial military 
operations and the legal implications of such operations, in particular and in relation to the 
second issue, the geographical scope of applicability of IHL.  
 
This paper will not provide detailed analysis on the threshold of non-international armed 
conflict; the use of force under public international law; the ethical, political and policy 
implications of ‘targeted killing’; the relationship between IHL and international human 
rights law; or the legal challenges emerging from unprecedented advancements in military 
robotics and autonomous weapons systems. While some of these issues will be taken into 
consideration over the course of the following analysis, the primary focus of this paper is on 
the legal implications of the geographical disjunction between the location of drone strikes 
and the primary battlefields for the application of IHL during NIACs of this type.   
 
The geographical scope of non-international armed conflict 
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Conventional international humanitarian law is silent as to the precise geographical scope of 
international humanitarian law during non-international armed conflict. Both Common 
Article 3 and Additional Protocol II make explicit reference to the territory of a High 
Contracting Party when delineating their respective material fields of application,12 which 
may suggest a broad scope of applicability that extends throughout the entire territory of 
the High Contracting Party where the conflict is occurring. Not unlike the very concept of 
NIAC itself, developments in international criminal law have provided valuable – albeit on 
occasion contradictory – material for the attempts in defining the geographical scope of 
international humanitarian law during NIAC.  
 
According to the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), with the emergence of a legally cognizable armed conflict, “international 
humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of the warring States or, in the 
case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party, whether or not 
actual combat takes place there.”13 In contrast to IAC, the Appeals Chamber did not advance 
an unqualified scope of IHL during NIAC, but clearly restricted its application to the 
territories under the control of a Party to the conflict. This interpretation confirms the 
applicability of IHL to territories that are beyond the control of a High Contracting Party and 
under the control of an organised armed group, a situation envisioned by Additional 
Protocol II.14 At the same time however, it also suggests that any territory potentially 
outside the control of the Parties to the conflict might not be subject to the application of 
IHL, irrespective of prevailing hostilities in the territory.  A requisite element of territorial 
control for determining the scope of IHL is difficult to reconcile with the fact that control 
over territory is not an indispensible requirement for the existence of a NIAC. 15 
Furthermore, neither the Appeals Chamber nor any subsequent ruling has quantified the 
nature or degree of control required by a Party to warrant the application of IHL. Such 
clarification is likely to prove pivotal during an armed conflict between two or more 
organised armed groups who are fighting for control over a limited portion of a state’s 
territory absent the latter’s involvement in the conflict. As will be discussed in the following 
sections, this formulation is also problematic in cases of extraterritorial NIAC where neither 
Party can be said to be in control of the territory.   
 
The jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) also offers an 
interpretation of the geographical scope of IHL during non-international armed conflict, 
holding that IHL “ … must be applied to the whole territory of the state engaged in the 
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conflict.”16 At first sight, the ICTR seems to offer a broader interpretation of the scope of IHL 
as it abandons the territorial control requirement advanced by the ICTY. Notably however, 
the ICTR approach necessitates the involvement of a High Contracting Party, applying to the 
whole territory of the state ‘engaged’ in the armed conflict. The precise wording of this 
formulation is problematic as its strict application would seem to preclude the application of 
IHL during armed conflicts between two or more organised armed groups absent the 
engagement of any state.  Again this is difficult to reconcile with the fact that neither 
conventional IHL nor existing jurisprudence require state engagement in order to determine 
the existence of NIAC.17 Other Chambers of the ICTR however have taken a slightly nuanced 
approach, holding that IHL, “ … extends throughout the territory of the State where the 
hostilities are occurring …”18 Arguably, this formulation is of further legal value as it 
dispenses with the requirement of territorial control advanced by the ICTY and the 
problematic prerequisite of state engagement inherent in the Akayesu judgment of the 
ICTR.19 Focusing on the territory of the state in which the hostilities are occurring, as 
opposed to the territory of the state(s) engaged in the hostilities, when defining the scope 
of applicability of IHL, also finds support in national jurisprudence.20 Furthermore, the 
practical utility of such an approach is particularly significant during extraterritorial NIAC 
where hostilities often occur on the territory of a state not party to the conflict.    
 
The textual inconsistences between these formulations should not be viewed 
inconsequential, as their resulting scopes of application hold determinative significance 
when considering the contemporary taxonomy of NIAC.21 The common thread that runs 
through all three formulations, and what is most pertinent to the discussion at hand, is the 
widely accepted territorial interpretation of the scope of IHL that is independent from the 
concept of hostilities, and extends to the geographical borders of the relevant state(s). This 
broad territorial interpretation of the scope of IHL during NIAC is easily and perhaps best 
understood in terms of the jurisdictional impetus of the criminal tribunals that produced 
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them.22 The standard line of defence in the ad hoc tribunals has been to deny the very 
existence of an armed conflict at the exact time and place where the alleged offences were 
committed.23 The absence of an armed conflict negates the concept of a war crime, thereby 
dissolving the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. However, such jurisdictional issues 
notwithstanding, the legal value of the unqualified extension of IHL to the geographical 
borders of the High Contracting Party is a questionable interpretation of the scope of IHL.   
 
Non-international armed conflicts are often circumscribed to comparatively limited and 
identifiable territories within the states in which they occur. For example, the armed conflict 
between the Sri Lankan armed forces and Tamil Tigers was largely confined to the Northern 
and Eastern Regions of Sri Lanka.24 The conflict between the armed forces of Uganda and 
the Lords Resistance Army is largely circumscribed to northern and north-eastern regions of 
Uganda;25 likewise the conflict between the ‘Huthis’ rebels and the armed forces of Yemen 
occurred primarily in the most northern region of Yemen;26 and the various armed conflicts 
that have plagued the Democratic Republic of the Congo over the last two decades have all 
largely occurred within its east and north-east regions.27  
 
What these examples highlight is that the existence of a NIAC does not necessarily equate to 
the entire state as being engulfed in hostilities, a situation that would certainly warrant the 
pervasive application of IHL. In cases of NIAC where the hostilities are largely constrained to 
limited territories, it would not only be unnecessary to extend IHL beyond these territories, 
but could also render IHL vulnerable to abuse. This is particularly relevant during NIAC, 
which often emerges against the backdrop of internal unrest and widespread violence, and 
where the shadow of armed conflict and the authority of IHL can be easily exploited to 
legitimise the otherwise unlawful uses of lethal force against individuals or during situations 
that are not directly related to the prevailing armed conflict. The existence of a NIAC in a 
limited portion of a state’s overall territory cannot serve as the legal basis for the 
unqualified application of IHL to any and all situations of civil unrest and violence within that 
state. Concerns over the unqualified extension of IHL during NIAC were raised during the 
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drafting of Protocol II where government experts “considered it inconceivable that, in the 
case of a disturbance in one specific part of a territory (in a town, for instance) the whole 
territory of the State should be subjected to the application of the Protocol.”28 It is 
submitted here that in situations of NIAC where the hostilities are restricted to limited 
areas, so too should be the application of IHL.   
 
Although indispensible to its effective regulation, IHL is but one piece of the legal puzzle 
applicable during NIAC. Both national law and international human rights law have equally 
important roles to play in the regulation of NIAC and its consequences. Therefore, the scope 
of these legal regimes, and the interplay between them, may also provide insight to the 
scope of IHL during NIAC. A number of human rights treaties contain a derogation clause 
allowing states to temporarily adjust certain obligations during situations of public 
emergency that threaten the life of a nation. What types of situations constitute a ‘public 
emergency’ for the purposes of derogation is not beyond debate, although it is generally 
uncontroversial that a legally cognizable armed conflict would suffice.29 Measures of 
derogations however, are not without restrictions, and must be limited to the extent strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation, including its temporal and geographical 
coverage.30 In relation to the unrest and armed violence between the Turkish armed forces 
and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), Turkey explicitly referenced the provinces that 
would be subject to measures of derogation, collectively referring to them as the ‘state of 
emergency region’ in its derogation notice to the Council of Europe.31  The European Court 
of Human Rights has found Turkey to be in violation of the European Convention on Human 
Rights when it extended its derogation powers to cities located outside “ … the region 
where a state of emergency has been proclaimed.”32 Restricting emergency legislation and 
powers to the territory(ies) affected by the emergency creates a balance between the 
exigencies of a situation and the legal obligations of the state concerned, and a pragmatic 
precedent for the scope of applicability of IHL.  
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The classification of the situation in Syria in 2012 provides a useful demonstration of this 
issue. As early as May 2012, the ICRC considered the prevailing situation in Baba Amr in 
Homs to have met the ICRC’s three requisite criteria for NIAC –intensity, duration and 
organization, while making clear that this factual reality was not uniform throughout the 
entire country.33 While the ICRC explicitly endorsed the existence of a NIAC in Syria, it 
clarified, "[t]hat does not mean that all areas throughout the country are affected by 
hostilities."34 Initially, the ICRC identified a limited number of areas that were affected by 
hostilities and thus subject to the application of IHL, but as the conflict intensified and 
hostilities spread, it acknowledged that other areas had become affected by hostilities and 
as a result, IHL applies ‘wherever hostilities between government forces and opposition 
groups are taking place across the country.’35 Of particular significance for the discussion at 
hand, is the ICRC statement that measures taken outside the areas affected by hostilities, 
including those against demonstrations with the purpose of restoring law and order, “must 
respect international law and standards governing the use of force in law enforcement 
operations.”36 These comments might be seen as marking a different approach to the 
longstanding “as wide as possible” position on the scope of Common Article 3.37 What is 
equally clear from the example of Syria, and indeed any armed conflict, is that the concept 
of NIAC is not static, but rather defined by the factual existence of collective hostilities 
between the Parties. As hostilities intensify, they are subject to spread and give rise to 
multiple dislocated areas affected by hostilities, in which the applicability of IHL will 
incontrovertibly follow. 
   
Moving away from the battlefield 
 
The appearance of drones in the arsenal of armed conflict has stimulated renewed attempts 
to define the parameters of the modern battlefield.38 The area in which military operations 
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are actually taking place at any given time is known as the 'area of operations' or 'theatre of 
war',39 or simply the ‘battlefield’.40 Conventional IHL contains references to “zones of 
military operations”,41 the ‘zone of combat’,42 and ‘battlefield areas’43 although does not go 
as far as to define these terms.44  The concept of the battlefield is as unpredictable as it is 
provisional, and defies static geographical delineation. The codification of the laws of armed 
conflict throughout the years is testament to this, going back to the provisions of the Lieber 
Code that apply to the armies ‘in the field’ and ‘along the front’ to the provisions of Protocol 
I that regulate attacks against military objectives that are located in a ‘city, town, or 
village’.45 In effect, the concept of a battlefield simply denotes the location in which 
hostilities are occurring, and its spatial dimensions are shaped and subject to change by the 
hostilities. 
 
While conventional IHL is replete with references to the concept of hostilities, it does not 
define the term.46 At its most basic, the concept of hostilities refers to “the (collective) 
resort by the parties to the conflict to means and methods of injuring the enemy.”47 While it 
is uncontroversial that hostilities includes attacks, defined as “acts of violence against the 
adversary, whether in offence or defense” it is generally accepted that is also includes other 
non-violent acts related to ongoing military operations.48 In the context of NIAC, the 
hostilities (and therefore battlefield) are generally the location where the predicate 
conditions of “protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized 
armed groups or between such groups” exist at any given time.49  While it is uncontested 
that IHL applies to such hostilities, restricting the application of IHL to the immediate 
geographical and temporal spheres of hostilities has been explicitly and consistently 
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rejected by the ICTY on the grounds that, “[t]here is no necessary correlation between the 
area where the actual fighting is taking place and the geographical reach of the laws of 
war.”50 In addition to and notwithstanding the jurisdictional issues discussed earlier, the 
extension of IHL beyond the immediate geographical and temporal spheres of hostilities is 
necessary to prevent attempts by the Parties to an armed conflict to evade the reach of IHL 
by relocating individuals and directing operations away from the immediate sphere of 
hostilities. Thus, individuals captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan and detained in 
Guantanamo Bay cannot be denied the protections of IHL because their detention is 
geographically and temporally removed from sphere of hostilities in which they were 
captured.51 Furthermore, it is clear that IHL can extend beyond the remit of hostilities to 
persons ‘taking no active part in the hostilities’, and ‘all persons affected by an armed 
conflict’52 and prohibits Parties from establishing places of internment and detention ‘close 
to the combat zone’.53 In light of all this, how then do we determine the geographical scope 
of IHL during NIAC beyond the immediate sphere of hostilities?   
 
Reference to developments in international criminal law relating to war crimes can prove 
instructive as to the scope of IHL beyond the immediate geographical and temporal spheres 
of hostilities.54 The broad territorial interpretation of the scope of IHL advanced by the ad-
hoc tribunals is further calibrated by a ‘nexus requirement’ for the prosecution of war 
crimes. The function of the nexus requirement serves to distinguish war crimes from purely 
domestic crimes and occurrences not directly related to the armed conflict.55 In order for an 
act or omission to qualify as a war crime, it must have been “closely related to the 
hostilities.”56 While the modalities governing the operation of the ‘nexus requirement’ are 
not instrumental to the discussion at hand, two points merit attention. First, it is clear that 
the nexus requirement does not demand a strict geographical or temporal proximity to the 
immediate sphere of hostilities.57  Second, the existence of a sufficient nexus is not 
everlasting but dependent upon the actions of an individual and the relation of those 
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actions to the existing armed conflict, and a range of factors exist that may dissolve the 
nexus between the acts or omissions of the accused and the armed conflict. 58 The 
advantage of the ‘nexus approach’ is that it is not territorially bound, but rather focuses on 
the link between an individual or conduct and an existing armed conflict. Such an approach 
to the scope of applicability of IHL is supported by the scope of conventional IHL applicable 
during NIAC. For example, the provisions of IHL that regulate the internment and detention 
of individuals, apply only for persons deprived of their liberty for reasons “related to the 
armed conflict.” 59  Similarly, the provisions on penal prosecutions apply only to the 
prosecution and punishment of criminal offences “related to the armed conflict.”60 The 
displacement of the civilian population is prohibited under IHL only for “reasons related to 
the armed conflict.”61 None of these provisions are geographically bound, but rather require 
only a relation, or in the words of the ICTY, a nexus to an existing armed conflict. The ‘nexus 
approach’ provides a legally tenable avenue to determine the extent to which IHL is 
applicable outside the immediate geographical spheres of hostilities. Invariably, this 
approach will require a case-by-case determination and in practice will be dictated by the 
specific provision or principle of IHL being applied. For example, and as will be discussed in 
the following sections, determining whether an individual is taking a direct part in hostilities 
requires the identification of three cumulative criteria; threshold of harm, direct causation, 
and belligerent nexus, which in practice, can either restrict or expand the application of IHL 
to individuals or objects within or beyond the primary sphere of hostilities.62  
 
To sum up the discussion thus far, the unqualified extension of IHL to the territorial borders 
of the state in which a NIAC is prevailing is both unnecessary and potentially dangerous. 
Restricting IHL to the immediate geographical sphere of hostilities is also problematic not 
least because it is not clear what acts are included in the remit of hostilities, but also 
because the provisions of conventional IHL clearly extend beyond such spheres. While the 
application of IHL to hostilities is both necessary and uncontroversial, its application beyond 
the primary geographical area of battle must be on the basis of a clear nexus to the 
prevailing armed conflict, subject to the criteria in the following analysis.   
 
Drone strikes in remote locations 
 
The possibility of recognising the ‘war on terror’ or ‘war against Al-Qaida’ as a distinct and 
legally cognisable armed conflict is a topic that has been subject to much debate and 
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analysis.63 For the purpose of our examination there is no need to repeat this debate or 
agree on an answer to this question. Instead, the main issue at hand is to identify in what 
circumstances might extraterritorial drone strikes be considered part of an armed conflict, 
and what are the challenges to making such determinations. Some situations are easier to 
classify than others, for example drone strikes by the US in areas of Afghanistan in which its 
military is already operating on the ground and against the same individuals its troops are 
fighting, would undoubtedly be part of the same armed conflict and subject to IHL. Based on 
the above analysis of internal NIACs, it can reasonably be argued that drone strikes in more 
remote areas of Afghanistan in which the US does not have ground troops, against members 
of the same armed groups, and who are currently taking a direct part in hostilities, could still 
be part of the same conflict and subject to the application of IHL.  Taking this a step further, 
if the armed group with which the state is already in the midst of an armed conflict has its 
camp and runs its military operations just across the border in a neighbouring state, and 
setting aside the possible questions of violating the ius ad bellum,64 neither the geographical 
distance or the crossing of the territorial border would necessarily negate the existence of a 
nexus between the individuals or their conduct and the prevailing armed conflict. This 
analysis leads toward a conclusion that could include extraterritorial drone strikes within the 
scope of IHL. There are however a number of parameters that must be examined before 
proceeding to such a conclusion. In particular, the analysis might be argued to change when 
any of the following three elements weaken – although not necessarily break – the nexus 
between the target and the armed conflict:  
 
i. the geographical distance from the primary sphere of hostilities; 
ii. the level and nature of military operations occurring at the target area;  
iii. the link between the target and an already occurring armed conflict.  
 
The latter point is a key question in the context of the ‘war on terror’, as it is not always 
clear whether the individuals targeted are in fact members of the same organised armed 
group the US is combating in Afghanistan.65 The more tenuous this connection, the more 
vital it is to see if the first two elements above might nevertheless still lead to the 
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applicability of IHL. This is because in the absence of an ability to encompass the target 
within the framework of an existing armed conflict, it will become necessary to show that a 
separate armed conflict exists between the state and the targeted armed group. The 
difficulty here is that if there is no other fighting elsewhere between members of this armed 
group and the state, then the only indication for the existence of an armed conflict will be 
the drone strikes themselves. It is however, highly questionable as to whether a one-sided 
drone strike can meet the threshold of intensity for armed conflict.66 The very concept of 
armed conflict signifies ‘protracted armed violence’ between two (or more) Parties,67 and 
drone strikes from the skies with all the attacking done by one side, and all the casualties on 
the other, hardly fits the bill. Removing this from the drone debates, consider a situation in 
which state forces turn all of their firepower on a particular group within their borders, with 
no fighting occurring from the group itself. The state would not fare well in garnering 
support for a claim that it is in the midst of an armed conflict. In fact, rather than being 
considered an armed conflict, this would more likely be viewed as a potential case of crimes 
against humanity.68 It is therefore submitted here that drone strikes alone are unlikely to be 
sufficient for the determination of a NIAC and the ensuing applicability of IHL. The armed 
group must itself be an active party in the conflict; like a tango, it takes two to war.69 Absent 
the third element of a link with a pre-existing armed conflict, the second element must 
encompass more than one-sided drone strikes, and include collective hostilities rising to the 
level of NIAC. Moreover, it requires emphasising that the state carrying out the drone 
strikes must be party to these hostilities – or acting at the request and jointly with a state 
which is party to the hostilities – for the drone strikes to be considered part of the armed 
conflict. However, and notwithstanding the room for further examination of these vexing 
and highly debatable issues, our current focus is on the first element above: the 
geographical aspect and how this affects the scope of IHL. 
 
The legal effect of crossing borders 
 
An earlier section covered the potential applicability of IHL within the territory of a state 
engaged in a NIAC, and whether this body of law can be assumed to apply throughout the 
territory of the state or not. An approach of this type is not, however, available in cases of 
an extraterritorial NIAC. Even in a so-called ‘spill-over’ conflict, presumably one would not 
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argue that IHL applies throughout the entirety of the neighbouring State on account of 
limited military operations chasing rebels across the border. This is even more so in drone 
strikes occurring in other states and further away from the primary battlefields. 
Extraterritorial situations emphasise the advantage of a test based on the actual fighting or 
a clear nexus to it, rather than unqualified application in the whole territory of a state. As 
will be seen in this section, as central a role as national borders continue to play in the 
context of the ius ad bellum and any sovereignty related matters, their impact on the 
applicability of the ius in bello is not of the same magnitude.  
 
The inviolability of state borders is at the heart of the rules on the ius ad bellum.70 Other 
than force used in the exercise of self-defence or with Security Council authorisation, and in 
accordance with the law regulating these actions, resorting to force across the borders of 
another state is likely to violate this body of law.71 But what bearing does this have on the 
determination of armed conflict and the applicability of IHL? While the separation of the ius 
ad bellum and ius in bello has long-standing support and for good reason, that does not 
mean there is no connection between the two.72 In particular, if state A’s violation of the ius 
ad bellum includes or leads to forcible encounters between two states, then an armed 
conflict will exist and the ius in bello will be applicable.73 Likewise if state A invades and 
occupies a portion of state B’s territory, this too could trigger the applicability of IHL 
between the two states. Marked differences of opinion can be found, however, when state 
A uses force on the territory of state B, but only against a non-state actor, as can be the case 
of a drone strike against a militant camp not associated with the state. One approach is that 
any resort to force on the territory of another state would lead to an IAC between them.74 
The other position, and the one supported here, holds that – while there may or may not 
have been a violation of the ius ad bellum –  the finding of an IAC between the two states is 
not an automatic conclusion, and this must be determined on the nature of the force and 
the context in which it was used.75 Not every forcible measure that violates a states’ 
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sovereignty is also an armed conflict between them. There may, for instance, be an armed 
conflict between state A and the armed group X, which does not involve state B despite 
parts of it occurring on state B’s soil. Moreover, forcible operations against a non-state actor 
on foreign soil can occur outside of any armed conflict: the forcible abduction of Eichmann 
by Israel from Argentinean territory did not mean that Israel and Argentina were at war, and 
there was no associated NIAC either. Conversely, in other circumstances there may – in 
addition to a NIAC between state A and group X – also develop an armed conflict between 
state A and state B, if for example their troops clash, or state A targets state B infrastructure 
or occupies its territory.76 These determinations will be made on a case-by-case basis. Such 
a finding and classification of any armed conflict will be determined on the basis of the 
Parties involved, and is a separate matter to the question of whether the ius ad bellum has 
been violated. The answer to the latter question will very much depend on the position 
taken with regard to the possibility of self-defence against non-state actors.77 This has all 
been debated at length elsewhere,78 and the primary point being noted for our current 
purpose, is that while the transgression of borders is key for determinations in the ius ad 
bellum, it is not the key determining factor for the finding of an armed conflict and the 
applicability of the ius in bello.      
 
The question before us relates to the role played by the location of drone strikes in the 
determination of the geographical scope of non-international armed conflict. In particular, if 
state A is engaged in an armed conflict with armed group X, does the use of extraterritorial 
drone strikes against members of X lead to a determination that there is an armed conflict – 
with the ensuing applicability of IHL – wherever these drone strikes occur? To further 
separate this question from the above concerns over the ius ad bellum, let us imagine that 
the drone strike is taking place against the military leadership of armed group X who are 
directing their operations via satellite radio from a ship on the high seas. No other state’s 
territory (or territorial waters) is being violated, and there is no reason to debate the ius ad 
bellum in respect of another state. Does IHL apply to this strike? For that to be the case, it 
would need to be concluded that the drone strike occurred within the context of an armed 
conflict, a matter that brings us back to the earlier raised issue of the circumstances 
whereby drone strikes might be considered as such.79 As a preliminary point, it should be 
noted that if IHL could apply to this strike on the high seas, it would be on the basis of an 
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armed conflict (meeting the requisite intensity and organisational threshold) being found 
between the state A and the armed group X. The fact that it occurred on the high seas does 
not alter this test. Likewise, if this same strike takes place on the soil of state B, the test for 
IHL applicability does not change; it is a question of determining the existence of an armed 
conflict between state A and group X. If – and this is not a given assumption, but rather a 
possibility that might only be true in particular circumstances – an armed conflict between 
them can be found in the context of strikes on the high seas, then one could equally be 
found when group X is camped in state B. Once again, that is not to render the ius ad bellum 
irrelevant for other purposes, such as determination of whether state B’s sovereignty has 
been violated, but simply to point out that it is not part of the test as to the existence of an 
armed conflict between state A and group X.  
 
The relevance of distance 
 
As seen earlier, there may be some debate as to the geographical scope of the armed 
conflict even when occurring within a single state, and in particular as to whether IHL 
applies throughout the state or only in specific areas.80 But as noted, the geographical 
spread of conflicts between states and armed groups cannot be ‘all or nothing’ (or rather 
‘everywhere or nowhere’) immediately applying to the whole territory of any state affected. 
How then, do we measure and determine the spread of armed conflict and applicability of 
IHL, and does it depend on the distance from the primary battlefield, leading to drone 
strikes far from the primary battlefield being excluded as not being part of the armed 
conflict? 
 
The question of distance contains two difficulties. Let us assume for the sake of argument 
that there is no question that state A and group X are engaged in an armed conflict which 
takes place in numerous parts of state A itself. Group X then sets up command and training 
camps just across the border in a remote area of state B, and which state B is not sponsoring 
but is unable to prevent. Group X leaders are based in this camp, their militants are based 
here and cross the border to carry out attacks before returning to camp, and rockets are 
even launched from the camp by group X against state A forces. Clearly a nexus exists, and 
operations by state A against this camp would be considered as part of the armed conflict 
and governed by IHL. Now let us move this camp from being along the border, inwards to an 
uninhabited mountainous region of state B, three miles from the border. This is unlikely to 
impact upon the analysis. But what if the mountainous region is ten miles away? fifty? One 
hundred? Let us assume that other than the distance no parameters have changed; 
provided all the above facts are still correct, it is unclear why the precise number of miles 
should affect the applicability of IHL. The second difficulty arises from a comparison 
between this scenario and a purely internal one: according to some of the earlier discussed 
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interpretations, a drone strike against armed and active members of group X holed up in a 
camp in a remote mountainous region of state A itself would be considered part of the 
armed conflict, even if this was fifty or one hundred miles away from the main battlefield 
area where most of the hostilities have been taking place. But if the reason for excluding the 
extraterritorial operation from the scope of the armed conflict is based on distance from the 
primary battlefield, why does the same distance-based reasoning not apply in internal 
situations? The cross-border element certainly affects the ius ad bellum, but other than that 
the conflict between state A and group X remains the same, as do the other facts set out 
above. Distance cannot therefore be the primary determinant for the applicability of IHL.  
 
One approach would potentially have any military operation between the state forces and 
active members of group X, seen as part of the armed conflict. To be clear, this approach 
does not allow for declaring open season on all past or present group X members around 
the globe. Neither the battlefield nor the hostilities relocate together with any individual 
who was on it or previously participating in it; if that were the case, it would be impossible 
to disengage from an armed conflict. Equally, however, by walking away from the primary 
combat zone, individuals cannot become immune from attack regardless of their status or 
the activity in which they engage. If an army general chooses to sit in a building a few miles 
on the outskirts of the main fighting zone and direct the troops by radio communication 
from that location, he or she will still be a legitimate target by virtue of their individual 
status. Likewise, if the individual is a member of an organised armed group and is sitting in a 
tent or cave a few miles from the main area where fighting is raging, and issuing operational 
orders by radio to his or her fighters, they too could be a legitimate target for attack – this 
would be true whether one uses the membership approach, the continuous combat 
function approach, or most of the various interpretations of direct participation.81 Once 
again, the applicability of the ius in bello does not depend on the number of miles between 
the individual and the fighters they are commanding and directing, nor does it stand or fall 
on whether the individual is sitting on one side of a border or the other. The tests are the 
standard and long-recognised requirements for determining who or what is a legitimate 
target under IHL, and while they are of course subject to varying interpretations, these 
interpretations do not change the relative irrelevance of distance or borders. The 
requirements for the applicability of IHL are: that an armed conflict is taking place,82 and 
                                                          
81
 For analysis of these various issues see K. Watkin, ‘Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC 
“Direct Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guidance’, 42 NYU Journal of International Law and Politics 
(201) 641; M. Schmitt, ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements’, 42 NYU 
Journal of International Law and Politics (2010) 641; B. Boothby, ‘“And for Such Time As”: The Time Dimension 
to Direct Participation in Hostilities’, 42 NYU Journal of International Law and Politics (2010) 641; H. Parks,  
‘Part IX of the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect’, 
42 NYU Journal of International Law and Politics (2010) 641; N. Melzer, ‘Keeping the Balance between Military 
Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of 
Direct Participation in Hostilities’, 42 NYU Journal of International Law and Politics (2010) 641. 
82
 See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.   
18 
 
that the operations in question are in fact between Parties to this armed conflict (nexus).83 
The status of the individuals targeted or the attributes of the objects targeted, will then be 
relevant as to the lawfulness in accordance with IHL (as opposed to its applicability).  
 
As noted, there are a number of areas of debate – factual and legal – and differing 
interpretations surrounding these issues. First, there may be a question as to the existence 
of an armed conflict. There must be a specific and identifiable armed conflict between 
identifiable parties. For example, drone strikes in Afghanistan, or even in Pakistan against 
militant groups taking part in the Afghan war, are more likely –  but far from always –  to 
fulfil this criteria. However, drone strikes in Yemen or Somalia must either be shown to be 
part of the same armed conflict the US is fighting in Afghanistan, or it must be 
demonstrated that the US is party to a different armed conflict involving the targets of these 
strikes (e.g. if acting by request to assist the Yemeni government in their own armed 
conflict). Second, even if such an armed conflict exists, there may be debates as to whether 
the targets of the drone strikes are in fact parties to this conflict. For example, the strikes in 
Pakistan are alleged to have targeted individuals from a wide range of militant groups, not 
all of whom possess a nexus to the armed conflict in Afghanistan.84 If, however, the above 
criteria are satisfied and IHL is deemed applicable, there will still remain heavy 
disagreement as to the correct test for determining which individuals may be targeted.  
 
There have been – and continue to be – heated debates over the rules that apply to 
targeting individual members of non-state armed groups, and whether their status or 
certain behaviours preclude them from civilian protection.85 Some would apply an approach 
which deems most members of the group to be legitimate targets, as is the case for most 
members of a State’s armed forces.86 Others would resist the analogy to state forces, noting 
that there is no recognition of a combatant status in NIAC, and would regard these 
individuals as belonging to the legal category of civilians.87 They would then be subject to 
the rule on loss of protection for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities; the 
interpretation of “for such time” and “direct participation in hostilities” thereby becomes 
the centre of controversy.88 Finally, a third option was proposed by the ICRC, whereby 
members of armed groups who carry out a continuous combat function, would cease to be 
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civilians and thus not have civilian protection from attack.89 While there can be significant 
implications with major repercussions from adopting one of these interpretations over the 
others,90 for the purpose of examining the geographical scope it is not, however, necessary 
to agree on which of these interpretations is most appropriate. The direct participation and 
continuous combat function model will both require some recognition that the targeted 
individual is engaging in the hostilities; even the wider membership approach will, in 
practice, likely be used for operations against individuals involved at some level in the 
combat activities, rather than the camp cooks. All of these will only be relevant if IHL is 
applicable – which is the issue of concern in the current examination. 
 
An important distinction must be drawn here between the previously discussed nexus to an 
armed conflict in general for the purposes of war crimes, and the ‘belligerent nexus’ 
developed for the purposes of determining direct participation in hostilities. The concept of 
belligerent nexus was derived and developed on the foundation of the general, although no 
less requisite, nexus requirement to determine potential war crimes.91 However, during the 
series of expert meetings hosted by the ICRC it was generally agreed that while a general 
nexus to an armed conflict is necessary for the application of IHL, it is not sufficient for the 
qualification of a particular act as direct participation in hostilities.92  In other words, not 
every act with a general ‘nexus’ to an armed conflict automatically qualifies as direct 
participation in hostilities and results in loss of civilian protection against direct attack.93 The 
concept of belligerent nexus is conceived more narrowly than the general nexus 
requirement developed in the jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR for the qualification of an 
act or omission as a war crime.94 The existence of a belligerent nexus “… presupposes a 
close relation to not only a pre-existing armed conflict, but also to already on-going 
hostilities between the Parties to that conflict.”95 In order to meet the requirement of 
belligerent nexus, “an act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required 
threshold of harm in support of a Party to the conflict and to the detriment of another.”96 Of 
all the controversy surrounding the ICRC guidance on direct participation in hostilities, and 
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in particular the criticisms of the constituent elements, the ‘belligerent nexus’ element 
evoked the least criticism.97 For the discussion at hand, it is important to note that the 
‘belligerent nexus’ necessary to determine direct participation in hostilities, while conceived 
and construed more narrowly than the general nexus to an armed conflict, does not seem to 
be geographically bound to the primary sphere of hostilities.98    
 
The geographical scope becomes relevant to this, insofar as the location of the individual 
might exclude him/her from being considered as directly participating in the hostilities (or 
carrying out a continuous combat function). This is particularly relevant during armed 
conflicts demonstrating substantial asymmetries in both the methods and means of armed 
conflict, a defining feature of NIAC in general. Indeed, extended geographical distance from 
the primary battlefield may preclude direct participation in hostilities for Parties with less 
sophisticated weaponry.99  The laws of armed conflict however are predicated on their 
equal application between the Parties to an armed conflict, and asymmetries of this type 
will not necessarily influence the scope of IHL. While it might not be as obvious a 
determination as when assessing the activity of an individual standing in the middle of a 
battlefield firing a weapon, almost all interpretative models will accept certain activities 
which do not require physical placement in the firing zone as nevertheless being part of the 
hostilities. The most obvious of these would be a commander issuing operational directions, 
but might also arguably include intelligence operations, planning of operations, and more.100 
The use of drones in the pursuit of hostilities is a prime example of the geographical 
disjunction between hostilities and direct participation therein. Obviously this is the case 
with regard to targets of drone attacks in remote areas. It also true however for the other 
side of the operations: often located thousands of miles from the prevailing hostilities, the 
drone operators during armed conflict are, as a result of their status or activities, subject to 
the application of IHL and liable to attack.101 In addition, drones often take off and land from 
a third location that is independent from both the operators controlling them and the 
hostilities in which they engage.102 These ‘launch pads’ where drones take off or land and 
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are serviced and loaded and re-loaded with munitions, also fall within the remit of 
legitimate military objectives and would be subject to the application of IHL regardless of 
their proximity to the hostilities. 103  This geographical disjunction between direct 
participation and the actual hostilities is not novel with the advent of drones. Naval 
personnel who launch missiles from warships located hundreds of miles from their target 
destination are also directly participating in hostilities despite the fact they can be located 
hundreds of miles out at sea.  Once again, the precise geographical location of the individual 
is not the determinant factor in the assessment of direct participation in hostilities and the 
scope of IHL.  
 
From all the above thus far, it becomes apparent that the applicability of the ius in bello is 
not as geographically bound as may have been assumed. It is not designed to follow state 
borders and, moreover, while the applicability of IHL revolves around a number of concepts, 
a hot-zone battlefield is not an indispensable requirement for every operation. There is of 
course first and foremost, the requirement that there be an armed conflict, without which 
the ius in bello simply does not apply. In addition to the armed conflict requirement, the 
other crucial concepts that may allow or restrict targeting operations are those of 
identifying the parties to the conflict, the notion of hostilities (participation in which can 
include more than simply firing a weapon), the definition of military objectives, and the 
status of individuals. Again, as seen earlier, these can all be pertinent to a multitude of 
situations not limited to the primary battlefield.  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
As is evident from the earlier analysis, the unqualified extension of IHL to the whole of the 
state experiencing an armed conflict is both an unnecessary and potentially dangerous 
application of IHL. Equally problematic however is restricting the scope of IHL to the primary 
geographical sphere of hostilities (the so called ‘hot-zone battlefield’), which not only 
produces counter-intuitive results, but is also not supported by conventional IHL or existing 
jurisprudence. The application of IHL is dependent upon the existence of an armed conflict, 
which necessitates the manifestation of hostilities, and IHL regulates those hostilities, 
wherever they spread. This appreciation however does not endorse the concept of a ‘global 
battlefield’ whereby the entire planet is subject to the application of IHL. In assessing 
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whether IHL applies to a particular drone strike, the foundational analytical step is 
determining the existence of an armed conflict between the state carrying out the strike 
and the armed group being targeted (general nexus to an armed conflict). In addition, as 
neither the battlefield nor hostilities necessarily relocate with individuals who were 
previously on it or engaged in them, it must also be determined that these individuals are in 
fact directly participating in hostilities and therefore do not enjoy civilian protection from 
attack (including the requirement of belligerent nexus). Drone strikes do not necessarily 
extend the battlefield; those that occur against legitimate targets within an already existing 
conflict are by default occurring in an area to which the conflict participation has already 
spread. Notwithstanding, there are a number of considerable legal (in addition to policy, 
ethical and other areas) aspects which will serve to restrict drone strikes. First, in many 
cases the existence of armed conflict between the striking state and the targeted group can 
be cast in doubt; nowhere is this clearer than in the so-called global war on terror or war on 
Al-Qaida (as opposed to the distinct conflict in Afghanistan). The nexus to an existing and 
identifiable conflict meeting the threshold requirements for classification as such, to which 
the state and group are Party, must exist; if there is no armed conflict to which the drone 
strikes are attached, then in most cases the legitimacy for direct lethal strikes will disappear. 
With no armed conflict, IHL will not apply, and the only remaining framework for regulating 
force will be that of law enforcement as found in international human rights law, which has 
a far more restrictive – although not absolutely prohibitive – regulatory approach to lethal 
force. Second, even if an armed conflict exists, the status of the individuals must be such 
that renders them to have lost protection under IHL. Third, resorting to force on the 
territory of another state must also be justified by, and taken in accordance with, the rules 
of the ius ad bellum. Unless acting with consent of State B,104 with UN Security Council 
authorisation,105 or under conditions satisfying the test for action in self-defence,106 any 
such strike would likely be in violation of the ius ad bellum, regardless of its compliance with 
IHL. It is therefore the ius ad bellum, rather than the ius in bello, which will more often serve 
as the primary barrier to prevent the precipitous spread of armed conflict to new territories. 
Finally, the legality of a particular drone strike may also be influenced by the interplay with 
international human rights law, whether confined to the territory of a single state or 
extraterritorial.107 While in no way beyond debate, human rights law may prove more 
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influential in its interplay with IHL the further away from the battlefield a drone strike 
occurs.108 Moreover, the lack of transparency regarding the decision making process and the 
targets, and the scant information from the ground as to the consequences of the strikes, 
turn any attempt at assessing the legality and seeking accountability into a gruelling task.109 
Notwithstanding, while all these and other possible rules regulating the force are issues that 
deserve further attention, the principle focus of this paper was on the geographical scope of 
applicability of IHL during drone strikes. This analysis has demonstrated that IHL is not in 
and of itself pre-determined as applying to a limited geographical scope, and its applicability 
is designed to follow the prevailing hostilities wherever they may spread, rather than vice 
versa.  
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